Does the insurance effect of public and private transfers favor financial deepening? Evidence from rural Nicaragua  by Hernandez, Emilio et al.
Ah
p
r
m
d
©
J
K
1
i
d
C
O
t
i
a
h
d
1
A
P
A
dAvailable online at www.sciencedirect.com
Review of Development Finance 2 (2012) 9–21
Does the insurance effect of public and private transfers favor financial
deepening? Evidence from rural Nicaragua
Emilio Hernandez a,∗, Abdoul G. Sam b, Claudio Gonzalez-Vega b, Joyce J. Chen b
a Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, Rome, Italy
b Agricultural, Environmental and Development Economics Department, The Ohio State University, United States
Available online 13 February 2012
bstract
The literature suggests CCTs and remittances may protect poor households from income risk. We present a theoretical framework that explores
ow this ‘insurance’ effect can change households’ decision to apply for a loan via changes in credit demand and supply. Empirical evidence from
oor rural households in Nicaragua shows CCTs did not affect loan requests while remittances increased them. The risk protection provided by
emittances seems stronger, relative to CCTs, such that improvements on borrowers’ expected marginal returns to a loan or on creditworthiness
ore than offset decreasing returns to additional income. This suggests those transfers that best protect households from income risk favor financial
eepening in the context of segmented markets.
2012 Production and hosting by Elsevier B.V. on behalf of Africagrowth Institute.
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.. Introduction
The outreach of public and private transfers has been grow-
ng considerably in the past decade among the poorest living in
eveloping countries. The provision of public transfers through
onditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programs, like the renowned
portunidades in Mexico and Bolsa Escola in Brazil, continue
o expand as they have been shown to encourage investment
n education and health among the rural and urban poor. In
ddition, access to private transfers in the form of remittances
as also been expanding among the rural and urban poor as
omestic and international migration flows increase. This study∗ Corresponding author. Tel.: +39 06 570 55910; fax: +39 06 570 56850.
E-mail address: emilio.hernandez@fao.org (E. Hernandez).
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 Open access under CC BY-NC-ND license.xplores how access to these types of transfers may affect house-
old participation in rural credit markets, via changes in credit
emand and supply, and contributes to the understanding of
he possible far-reaching effects they may have on household
ehavior.
We present a theoretical framework that links the migra-
ion and CCT literature with that of rural credit markets in
eveloping countries in a way that explains how access to
hese transfers may impact credit market outcomes. We empir-
cally test this framework using panel data from poor rural
ouseholds participating in a randomized CCT program con-
ucted in Nicaragua named Red de Protección Social. Many
f these households had domestic migrants sending remit-
ances during the same time period, as part of their income
isk management strategies. We then evaluate the impact that
aving access to CCTs and remittances had on the house-
old’s decision to request a loan, considering the exogenous
ature of the CCT and the endogenous nature of remit-
ances.
The literature that explores the motives and effects of migra-
ion is vast and it offers no single element as the cause forigration (Taylor and Martin, 2001). It suggests that migration
ay be undertaken in order to increase household income and
vercome liquidity constraints (Lucas, 1987). It may also be a
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ay for households to reduce unforeseen income fluctuations.
n turn, this protection from income risk may lead to changes
n investment and consumption decisions that would have not
ccurred had migration not taken place (Stark, 1991). This is the
iew of the New Economics of Labor Migration (NELM) liter-
ture, which explains migration as an inter-temporal household
trategy that reduces income risk by spatially diversifying the
ousehold’s portfolio of income-generating activities (Stark and
evhari, 1982). In this context, the migrant is seen as a member
f a geographically extended family who acts in coordination
ith other members to reduce idiosyncratic risk. Therefore,
igration can be considered an informal risk-sharing mecha-
ism among the geographically extended family to manage and
ope with risk (Dercon, 2002; Fafchamps, 2007).
The literature also suggests that public transfers in the form
f CCTs may provide income risk protection, as households
ay save part of the transfer and use these savings during times
f need. There is evidence that CCTs may allow households to
ope better with idiosyncratic shocks, such that when they occur
ouseholds are able to keep children in school (de Janvry et al.,
006); smooth consumption (Maluccio, 2005); and hold on to
ssets (Alderman and Hoddinott, 2007).
Given the evidence about the insurance effect of remit-
ances and CCTs on poor households, one would expect to
lso observe an influence on household participation in credit
arkets, as protection from risk may change household risk
anagement strategies through improvements in their expecta-
ions about future states of the world. The literature on credit
arkets considers these expectations a key determinant of
ousehold credit demand and supply. This paper contributes
o the literature by exploring this additional and complex
ink.
Our findings show that CCTs did not have a significant
ffect on the likelihood of requesting a loan, while remit-
ances increased it. The significant positive effect of access to
emittances suggests that the potential reduction in income risk
ncreases the household’s expected marginal returns from a loan
r the household’s creditworthiness as perceived by lenders in
way that more than offsets the decreasing marginal returns
aused by the additional income. The net result encourages the
ecision to request a loan. The limited flexibility of CCTs, rela-
ive to remittances, in adjusting to the magnitude and timing of
dverse shocks may explain their weak effect on this household
ecision. For a positive effect to be determined, the improve-
ents in expectations need to be sufficiently strong to more
han offset decreasing returns to additional income. This evi-
ence supports the notion that transfers that best protect poor
ouseholds from income risk favor financial deepening, some-
hing that has been shown to have important implications in the
rocess of economic development (Berthelemy and Varoudakis,
996; Beck et al., 2007).
The paper is built in the following way. Sections 2 and 3
resent a theoretical framework that explains the possible effects
f access to transfers on the household’s decision to request a
oan. Section 4 describes the basic characteristics of the data.
ection 5 discusses the main methodological challenges and the
esults. And Section 6 concludes.
c
f
iopment Finance 2 (2012) 9–21
. The insurance effect of transfers and its implication
n credit markets
The literature that studies credit markets in developing coun-
ries is quite vast and we highlight its link with the NELM and
CT literature to explain how access to these types of transfers
ay affect household participation in credit markets. In particu-
ar, we argue that the effect on credit market outcomes is through
he modification of the borrower and lender expected marginal
eturns given their ability to respond to the different states of
ature that may occur during the credit contract.
Some of the prevailing types of lenders in credit mar-
ets in developing countries are relatives and friends, local
oneylenders, input suppliers, product traders, microfinance
rganizations, cooperatives and banks. These lenders coexist
ecause each one has informational and contract enforcement
dvantages over the others, which allow them to evaluate credit-
orthiness in a cost-effective manner only for a certain segment
f borrowers (Conning and Udry, 2007). However, the difficulty
or different types of lenders to obtain relevant information about
he credit applicant’s ability and willingness to repay leads to
everal forms of credit rationing. That is, credit markets may not
lear, as some creditworthy borrowers with a legitimate demand
or credit may not get a loan or may get a smaller loan than the
ne desired at the going interest rate due to information asymme-
ries (Stiglitz and Weiss, 1981), interest rate restrictions set by
olicy makers (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984) or contract enforcement
onsiderations (Bell, 1988).
In this context, credit demand and supply models such as
ochar (1997) and Gonzalez-Vega (1984) formalize the notion
hat expectations about the different states of nature during the
redit transaction play a fundamental role in credit market out-
omes, given the inter-temporal nature of the credit contract. A
ousehold decides whether to apply for a loan or not after com-
aring the household’s expected marginal returns from the use
f the loan and the expected marginal costs attached to the loan.
he latter are driven in part by the lender’s expected marginal
ost of providing the loan to that particular household.
If access to remittances or CCTs protects the household
gainst income risk, then they may also improve its expecta-
ions about being able to successfully cope with bad states of
ature or adopt riskier but more productive technologies. This,
n turn, may improve the household’s expected marginal returns
o a loan, increasing the likelihood of credit transactions. If, as
he NELM and CCT literature suggest, households with access
o remittances or CCTs are better able to smooth consumption
nd make new investments, there are reasons to believe that this
hange might be accompanied by an increase in the demand for
redit, since credit would facilitate such changes in livelihood
trategies.
Similarly, a reduction in the household’s exposure to income
isk may modify the lender’s expected marginal costs of offer-
ng a loan. These marginal costs are composed of the lender’s
xpected loss in case of default plus screening and monitoring
osts (Gonzalez-Vega, 1984; Kochar, 1997). If access to trans-
ers indeed reduces the borrower’s income risk and if the lender
s aware of this change in risk profile, then expected losses in
E. Hernandez et al. / Review of Development Finance 2 (2012) 9–21 11
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tig. 1. PDFs for marginal returns obtained by using two different production
echnologies for a household with a given amount of resources (R).
ase of default should decrease, reducing the lender’s expected
arginal costs of offering a loan amount and making it more
ikely for the household to apply for credit.
Although access to remittances and CCTs may improve the
ikelihood of participation in credit markets through a reduction
n risk exposure, they may also reduce the household’s benefit
rom a loan, given the assumption to decreasing marginal returns
o additional income, as explained in the following section.
. A theoretical framework
We present a simple graphical analysis that conceptualizes
he process through which a transfer that is uncorrelated – or
egatively correlated – to household income might affect its
ecision to request a loan.
The household’s marginal returns from the use of its own
esources and any other complement, such as a loan or a trans-
er, depend mainly on the production technology used and the
arket opportunities available, such as the price for its prod-
cts or services. However, the final outcome of the production
nd income-generating process is uncertain, as there are several
ossible states of nature that may occur and that the household
akes an effort to foresee. Therefore, the marginal returns to a
iven amount of resources (R) may be conceptualized as a dis-
ribution with a probability density function (PDF). Fig. 1 shows
n example of two PDFs for marginal returns obtained by using
wo different production technologies that a household with a
iven amount of resources may use.
In Fig. 1, the PDF with a smaller variance represents all the
otential marginal returns that the household would obtain by
sing a technology that is relatively ‘safe’ and the probabil-
ty that each one of these marginal returns may be observed,
iven all possible states of nature. The technology is ‘safer’
n the sense that the potential marginal returns are concen-
rated around their mean value, MR1. However, the expected
mean) returns achieved by using this technology are lower than
hose obtained when using an alternative riskier technology.
n this case, the potential marginal returns are more dispersed
round their higher mean, MR2. Assuming that the household’s
egree of risk aversion is given, the household will choose
etween these two production technologies (or input combina-
ions) depending on its willingness to tolerate risk (namely, its
isk behavior). A household that might not be well equipped to
m
d
hts marginal costs of a loan, MC (L), before and after the receipt of a transfer, T.
ope with unforeseen states of nature might be inclined to choose
he safer technology, at the expense of a productivity loss.
When considering whether to apply for a loan or not, the
ousehold compares the expected marginal returns from the use
f its resources (plus the loan) to the marginal costs of the loan.
iven the choice of a production technology or input mix, a
chedule of expected marginal returns, EMR(R), will reflect
he expected outcomes from using different levels of resources.
his schedule is shown in Fig. 2. In addition, this figure shows
he household’s expected marginal costs of using different loan
mounts, MC(L). Each point along the EMR(R) schedule would
e associated with a PDF of potential outcomes, as the ones
escribed in Fig. 1. In addition, the household may also consider
he penalties associated with default as well as the probability of
his adverse outcome. It is thus possible that a household that is
ery weary of the risk of default would demand a loan size that
s less than the size associated with the expected returns. This
isk-adjusted expected marginal returns to resources are given
y M1′ and M2′ in Fig. 1, and would determine the position of
he EMR(R) curve.
Next, we analyze how the household’s risk-adjusted expected
arginal returns change as its resource endowment, R, increasesue to the receipt of a transfer. In this example, the household
as an initial resource endowment equivalent to Ro.
1 Development Finance 2 (2012) 9–21
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The EMR(R) curve is downward sloping, reflecting the
ssumption of decreasing marginal returns to additional
esources. The area under this curve represents total expected
ross returns from the use of resources, for a given level of
esource use. The position of the EMR(R) curve indicates how
rofitable the household is. As explained at the beginning of this
ection, the position of this curve depends on the choice of pro-
uction technology made, the market opportunities available to
he household, and the household’s willingness to tolerate risk.
Fig. 2(a) shows how the household has an upward sloping
C(L) curve which is determined by the lender’s expected
arginal costs of providing a loan plus the household’s transac-
ion costs for applying. The curve is upward sloping because the
isk of default increases proportionally more than the lender’s
xpected marginal returns, as the loan size augments. Therefore
or the same loan product, larger loans are charged higher inter-
st rates. The household will request a loan of size Ld such that
ts expected marginal returns equate its expected marginal costs,
t point B in Fig. 2. At this point, the household’s total expected
ross returns from the use of its own resources – represented by
he area under the EMR(R) curve to the left of Ro – is comple-
ented with the maximum expected net returns from the use of
loan – represented by the area of the triangle ABC. Notice that
he cost of the loan is represented by the area under the MC(L)
urve along the segment CB.
What happens when the household receives a transfer, T?
olding all else equal, Fig. 2(b) shows that the household’s
wn resource endowment increases to Ro + T. Due to dimin-
shing marginal returns, any addition to the household’s use of
esources – such as a loan – will contribute less to total expected
eturns than what it would have done before the transfer. This is
epresented by the reduction in the area of triangle ABC in the
gure. Therefore, if the only change is an increase in the access
o resources, the opportunity to increase the household’s total
xpected returns through a loan declines and, if the transfer is
arge enough, it might even disappear. Thus the receipt of the
ransfer would discourage the request of a loan.
However, it is possible that transfers such as remittances or
CTs may cause additional changes, as explained in Section
. If the transfer reduces the household’s exposure to income
isk and its weariness of credit default, this would imply that
he EMR(R) curve would shifts upwards as shown in Fig. 3(a).
otice that, after this shift, total expected returns from the use of
loan increase to the amount represented by the new area ABC
nd make the loan more attractive for the household.
If lenders are aware that the transfer received by the household
owers its exposure to income risk, then the lenders’ expected
oss from default should decrease, shifting the MC(L) curve
ownwards. That is, the perception of the borrower’s cred-
tworthiness improves. This is represented in Fig. 3(b). The
ownward-shift of the MC(L) curve would further increase total
xpected returns from a loan, to the amount represented by the
ew area ABC, providing further incentive for the household to
pply for a loan. Notice that, given the information asymmetries
hat exist in credit markets, lenders may not be aware of the effect
f the transfer, and therefore the MC(L) may not shift even if
he borrower’s expected marginal returns to the loan improve.
t
c
t
wig. 3. The possible effect of a transfer, T, on the position of the borrower’s E
R(R) curve, and the borrower’s MC(L) curve.
In summary, there are three possible effects that a trans-
er may have on the household’s decision to apply for a loan
nd these have opposite signs. First, the decrease in expected
arginal returns to resources after the receipt of the trans-
er reduces the opportunity to add to the household’s total
xpected returns through the use of a loan. Second, if the trans-
ers were to protect the household from income risk, then this
ay improve the household’s risk-adjusted expected marginal
eturns to resources, increasing the opportunity to profit from a
oan. Third, the latter effect would be reinforced if lenders were
ble to detect the household’s lower risk profile, which would
mprove their perception of its creditworthiness. Therefore, the
ffect of such a transfer is theoretically ambiguous and determin-
ng the net result of these opposing forces on the household’s
ecision to request a loan is an empirical exercise.
. The RPS data
To test the theoretical framework we use data from the RPS.
his program began with a pilot phase carried out between
000 and 2002, and it continued with a second phase from 2003
o 2005. The program consisted of the provision of an average
ash transfer of US$300 per year to poor rural households in
he form of a randomized field experiment. These transfers
ere given mostly to mothers and were conditional on the
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other’s attendance to periodic health workshops, minimum
mprovements in child health indicators, children’s school
ttendance and children’s intake of anti-parasites, vitamins and
accines (Maluccio and Flores, 2004). This study uses the data
ollected for the pilot phase. Year 2000 is the baseline year and
ears 2001 and 2002 are the after treatment periods.
Table A1 in the Appendix shows attrition levels for the
ontrol and treatment groups for the baseline and follow-up sur-
eys. Total attrition among treatment and control groups in the
alanced panel looks similar, which may favor comparability.
owever, the randomization of the sample is valid only as long
s this attrition is itself random.
. Data analysis and econometric model
.1. Veriﬁcation of randomization and general
haracteristics of the sample
The first step in this evaluation is to verify if attrition was
andom. Given that baseline data are available, we can compare
ttritors with non-attritors, to see if there are systematic differ-
nces between them that would bias results. For example, it is
ossible that those not so poor households that benefited from
he program were able to migrate locally to other communi-
ies with better job opportunities, which would underestimate
mpact measures. Alternatively, those households benefiting the
east from the RPS may have dropped out, which would imply
n overestimation of impact measures.
In order to test whether attrition was random, a mean dif-
erence test between attritors and non-attritors, as well as for
he control and treatment groups, is made and results are shown
n Table 1. The t-values are significant suggesting that attrition
as likely non-random leaving significant differences between
ontrol and treatment groups.
Table 1 also offers a general idea of the level of poverty of
ouseholds in the sample. Households in control and treatment
roups have young adult members. The average age of all mem-
ers 15 years old or older was 23 years. Around 17 percent of
he households applied for a loan during the 12 months before
he baseline survey. The proxy we use to represent credit market
utcomes is whether the household applied for a loan or not.
his request is influenced by both the household’s demand and
upply of credit, which is of interest for our analysis as it also
onsiders the characteristics of those households that decide not
o apply for a loan.
In addition, the survey asks whether the loan was requested
rom formal sources (banks, NGOs or credit cooperatives) or
nformal sources (such as relatives, neighbors, friends, money
enders, input suppliers, crop buyers, and the like), which cover
ost of the places where the households may seek a loan.
Although there is great heterogeneity among the types
f credit suppliers that reach the poorest population in rural
icaragua, loans from the available sources are characterized
y short terms to maturity. Dauner (1998) is perhaps the
ost comprehensive analysis of the characteristics of rural
nancial markets in Nicaragua. She reports that 90 percent
f the loans granted during 1995 to a representative group of
t
s
t
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ural households had a repayment period of less than a year.
mong the poorest sector of the rural population, the only use
eported for these short-term loans were for consumption and
he purchase of fertilizer and seeds.
In 2000, about seven percent of the households in the RPS
eported having access to remittances – where access refers to
aving a migrant who is able to send them remittances either
eriodically or just in case of an idiosyncratic shock. The concept
f remittances used in the survey was that of some assistance,
ither in cash or in kind, from relatives or friends that emigrated
omestically or internationally.
Migration flows for the household sample are mainly tem-
orary. Only 1.3 percent of households that reported access to
emittances had this benefit during the three years observed.
n addition, 86 percent of these recipient households reported
hat remittances came only from domestic migration, while 9
ercent reported remittances from international migration, and
percent from both types of migration. Looking at the house-
olds that reported the receipt of remittances, the frequency with
hich these are received varies. Although most remittances are
ent on a monthly basis, as shown in Table 2, some households
eport receiving them once every semester or once every year.
There is a distinction between access and actual receipt of
emittances that is relevant in our analysis. Sample households
hat have access to remittances are later asked if, by the time
he survey was conducted, they had actually received any remit-
ances and their value. Because many households seem to receive
emittances sporadically depending on idiosyncratic shocks,
here are many households that had not received remittances
y the time of the survey, although they report having access to
hese transfers. It is then the ability to access remittances should
uture shocks occur, not whether the household had received
emittances by the time of the survey, what is being captured in
ur the analysis.
In summary, these rural households are characterized by hav-
ng young members. They make little use of credit and few of
hem have access to remittances mostly from temporary and
omestic migrants. They would be categorized as very poor
hen using as a threshold an average per capita consumption
f less than a dollar a day. These characteristics coincide well
ith the livelihood of the poor in many parts of the world as
escribed by Banerjee and Duflo (2006).
.2. Impact estimates for access to CCTs
In Section 5.1, we present evidence of intrinsic observ-
ble differences between treatment and control groups in the
alanced panel, despite randomization, which violates the con-
itions under which OLS impact estimates are valid. Previous
tudies analyzing the RPS have argued these differences may
e time–invariant and, under this parallel trend assumption, the
ouble difference (DD) of means between groups would yield
nbiased impact measures (Maluccio and Flores, 2004). In addi-
ion to using the DD technique, we explicitly account for the
election bias caused by non-random attrition using a Heckman
wo-step model (Heckman, 1979), which allows us to explicitly
ccount for attrition in the presence of time–variant differences.
14 E. Hernandez et al. / Review of Development Finance 2 (2012) 9–21
Table 1
Mean difference test for non-attritors and attritors and for control and treatment groups in the baseline survey (year 2000).
Non-attritors Attritors Control Treatment
n = 1359 N = 222 n = 653 N = 706
Average age of adult members (those 15 years old or older)
Mean 24.45 24.63 22.77 24.84
t-Statistic −0.45 −2.62***
p-Value 0.65 0.01
Percentage of households that requested a loan
Mean 17.9 15.3 19.91 16.0
t-Statistic 0.97 1.87*
p-Value 0.33 0.06
Percentage of households that report having a microenterprise
Mean 12.29 13.06 11.48 13.03
t-Statistic −0.32 −0.87
p-Value 0.75 0.37
Percentage of households participating in community organizations
Mean 20.60 15.31 20.50 20.68
t-Statistic 1.99** −0.07
p-Value 0.05 0.94
Per capita value of durable goods (Cordobas)
Mean 399.16 297.54 375.11 421.41
t-Statistic 1.70* −0.80
p-Value 0.09 0.42
Per capita annual consumption (Cordobas)
Mean 3885.08 3854.27 3738.24 4020.90
t-Statistic 0.14 −1.83*
p-Value 0.89 0.07
Average number of members living in the household
Mean 6.18 5.94 6.31 6.07
t-Statistic 1.02 1.46
p-Value 0.31 0.14
Percentage of households that received beneﬁts from social programs other than RPS
Mean 47.83 27.93 50.07 45.75
t-Statistic 6.01*** 1.59
p-Value <0.01 0.11
Percentage of households with access to remittances
Mean 0.06 0.09 0.07 0.06
t-Statistic −1.08 0.93
p-Value 0.28 0.35
Value of remittances per year (Cordobas)
Mean 131.08 166.46 121.77 139.69
t-Statistic −0.37 −0.23
p-Value 0.71 0.81
* Significant at the 90% confidence level.
** Significant at the 95% confidence level.
*** Significant at the 99% confidence level.
Table 2
Frequency of remittances sent by migrants during 2000, 2001 and 2002.
2000 (%) 2001 (%) 2002 (%)
Biweekly 17.1 11.2 10.9
Monthly 25.0 32.5 44.5
Trimester 26.3 18.7 13.9
Semester 21.0 16.2 17.8
Annually 10.5 21.2 12.8
Number of migrants sending remittances
to households back home
76 80 101
Number of households that received
remittances during the year
52 (60) 63 (76) 88 (100)
All numbers are percentages, except for the last two rows, which refer to number
of households. The numbers in parenthesis are the percentage of households that
received remittances from the total that reported access to remittances.
D
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1
zespite distributional assumptions regarding the error terms,
his method for identifying attrition mechanisms has been shown
o yield point estimates that are consistent with those obtained
ith semi-parametric and non-parametric methods in the con-
ext of randomized control trials that suffer non-random attrition
Grasdal, 2001).
Following Duflo et al. (2007), the specification we use to
stimate the DD impact estimate is given below:
it = α + βt1 + φt2 + γPi + δat1Pi + δbt2Pi + εit (1)
here Yit is equal to 1 if the household requested a loan andero otherwise; t1 and t2 are dummies for the years 2001 and
002, once the program was implemented. Pi has a value of
if the household was assigned to the treatment group, and
ero otherwise. The parameters of interest are δa and δb, which
E. Hernandez et al. / Review of Devel
Table 3
CCT impact estimates on credit request obtained through the double difference
(column I) and the Heckman two-step selection model (column II).
Selected parametersa Credit request (I) Credit request (II)
T1 −0.047** (0.021) −0.107*** (0.040)
t2 −0.083*** (0.019) −0.168*** (0.045)
Pi −0.039** (0.020) −0.046* (0.025)
δa 0.016 (0.027) 0.018 (0.036)
δb 0.027 (0.025) 0.050 (0.032)
Inverse Mills’ ratio – −0.591** (0.298)
Number of observations 4077 4077
Censored observations – 215
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
a Other variables included in the Heckman two-step model include number of
men, women and children, average age of members over 15 years of age, dummy
for whether the home plot is owned with or without a title, reported value of
home, participation in programs other than RPS, participation in community
organizations, existence of a microenterprise.
* Significant at the 90% confidence level.
** Significant at the 95% confidence level.
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epresent the mean program effects for 2001 and 2002 relative
o 2000. The random error of the estimated equation is given by
it.
An important consideration in this case, is the fact that the
PS randomized treatment at the comarca level, not at the
ousehold level. Comarcas are administrative areas that include
everal communities and are determined by the National Insti-
ute of Statistics and Censuses. This randomization procedure
reates a problem of grouped error terms that may cause the
ariance covariance matrix of the OLS estimation of DD esti-
ates to be block-diagonal with correlation among error terms
ithin each comarca cell. To get an improvement in the esti-
ation of standard errors we use block bootstrapping as shown
y Efron and Tibshirani (1994), which has been shown to bet-
er account for the possibility of serial correlation in addition to
rror clustering.4
Throughout, a linear probability model is used because it
llows for parameter estimates that are more tractable, easier
o interpret and flexible in handling unobserved heterogeneity
elative to tobit or logit models (Hyslop, 1999; de Janvry et al.,
006).
The results presented in Table 3 show that both the DD and
he Heckman two-step impact estimates are statistically insignif-
cant, although positive. The significance of the inverse Mills’
4 Block bootstrapping was found to yield robust standard errors relative
o clustering techniques, given that is accounts for the possibility of serial
orrelation common in data with large time series (Bertrand et al., 2004).
n practice we take 200 random household samples with replacement from
ach comarca matrix and, for each household, we keep the entire time
eries of variables and time and household dummies. For every random sam-
le we compute our estimated parameters, ˆβj , where j is the independent
ariable of interest. We then compute the bootstrapped standard error as:
eboot( ˆβj) =
√
(1/200 − 1)
∑200
n−1( ˆβj,n − ¯βj)
2
where ¯βj is the usual sample
ean ¯βj=1/200
∑200
n=1 ˆβj,n.
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atio in the selection model suggests attrition bias is present and
s accounted for.
In the context of our theoretical framework, results suggest
hat even if the RPS improved marginal expected returns to a
oan or the household’s creditworthiness as perceived by lenders,
hese effects were largely offset by the decrease in expected
arginal returns to additional income caused by CCTs. The
ossible reasons for this likely relate to the characteristic of the
ransfer. It has been shown that RPS households used part of the
ransfer to make investments related to education, health and
utrition that they would have not otherwise made. Therefore
rom the fixed transfer amount received periodically, a fraction
s saved in order to cope with future negative shocks. However
his saving does not necessarily coincides with the timing or the
agnitude of future negative shocks, which represents a limit in
he level of risk protection that CCTs may offer.
Another possible explanation for the lack of influence of
CTs on loan requests may relate to the fact that the RPS
rovided transfers mostly to women. We argue that gender-
ifferentiated use of transfers and credit can be ruled out in the
ollowing section, as we gain further insights on the household’s
se of remittances. In addition, the perceptions about the perma-
ence of the RPS might provide some explanation of results. If
he households do not know how long they will be able to receive
he program’s benefits it is unlikely that household expectations
bout the future will suffer major changes. As it is common in
mpact studies, the mechanisms that produce net results are not
asy to isolate, and we can only discuss the several possible
auses and rule out unlikely scenarios.
.3. Impact estimates for access to remittances
Contrary to CCTs, migration and consequently access to
emittances is the result of a household strategy. To control for
he self-selection problem this entails we use two-stage least
quares (2SLS) with an instrumental variable (IV) to estimate
he impact of access to remittances on the decision to request
loan, as shown by Angrist (2001). In the household sample
sed, remittances come mostly from temporary and domestic
igration. Thus any inference is limited to this particular migra-
ion typology, which seems prevalent among the poorest rural
ouseholds in developing countries (Banerjee and Duflo, 2006;
endola, 2008).
We take the household as the unit of analysis, including all
igrant members. This follows the NELM theoretical frame-
ork that conceptualizes migration as a strategy of the whole
patially diversified family. Then we estimate the following sys-
em of equations:
Yit = αshs + α1t1 + α2t2 + δat1Pi + δbt2Pi + α3Xit + α4Mit + εit
Mit = ωshs + ω1t1 + ω2t2 + μat1Pi + μbt2Pi + ω3XMit + ω4Zit + εMit
(2)
here αs are household fixed effects to capture observable
nd unobservable time–invariant heterogeneity; t1,2 are year
ummies for 2001 and 2002 that capture contextual variables
ommon to all households; δa and δb are the impact estimates of
CTs on the decision to request a loan in 2002 and 2003, which
e include as a robustness check of DD estimates; Xit are a set of
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ime–variant observable characteristics influencing the decision
o request a loan; and εit is the random error of the estimated
quation.
The ‘first stage’ equation determines the endogenous variable
it equal to 1 if household i has access to migrant remittances
uring year t and zero otherwise; ωs and t1,2 are, again, house-
old and time fixed effects;μa andμb are CCTs impact estimates
n access to remittances in 2002 and 2003; XMit is a set of observ-
ble time–variant characteristics that influence access to migrant
emittances; ZMit is an exogenous variable used as an instrument;
nd εMit is the equation’s random error term. The parameter esti-
ate α4 is the one of interest, as it represents the impact of access
o remittances on the decision to apply for a loan. A linear prob-
bility model is used to determine Eq. (2), given the ease of
nterpretation it provides and its flexibility under unobserved
eterogeneity (Angrist, 2001; Hyslop, 1999). The set XMit has
union with set Xit and both sets are selected based on the
igration and financial literature, as shown in Table 4.
The key part of our analysis is finding an instrument, ZMit,
hat is highly correlated with access to remittances but not cor-
elated with the household’s decision to request a loan, such that
he influence of remittances on this decision is obtained only
hrough this instrument. The IV procedure would allow for con-
istent estimates by taking into account the correlation in the
isturbances across the two equations in (2) (Angrist, 2001).
The instrumental variable proposed is the percentage of
ouseholds within the community with at least one migrant.
his IV serves as a proxy for migrant networks, which have
een shown to facilitate migration through a reduction of
ransaction costs, the creation of job referrals, and acquiring
nowledge about economic opportunities outside the commu-
ity (Massey and Espinosa, 1997; Munshi, 2003). But the initial
ormation of migrant networks has important determinants that
re non-economic. Following the cumulative causation theory
f migration, once a member of the community migrates it
tarts a cumulative process that changes the culture and values
owards migration within members living in the origin commu-
ity (Massey et al., 1993). For example, migration may become
‘rite of passage’ of life, and those young men and women
ho do not attempt to elevate their status through migration to
ig cities or other countries are looked down-upon. This ‘social
earning’ shapes the household’s migration behavior and deter-
ines whether or not it has access to remittances. However,
iven its non-economic determinants, it remains orthogonal to
he household’s productivity and its expected marginal returns
nd cost of a loan.5 We argue the cumulative theory of migration
est explains migration behavior in the sample, and that there
re no general equilibrium effects within communities. The data
llows us to provide evidence supporting this claim.The orthogonality of the IV with the decision to request a
oan should be enhanced by the fact that we are able to control
or intrinsic differences between communities through two-way
5 Other studies that exploit the non-economic determinants of migrant net-
orks in order to measure the economic impact of migration on origin
ommunities include Rozelle et al. (1999), Munshi (2003) and Mendola (2008).
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xed effects. We are able to check the robustness of the 2SLS
rocedure by adding time-community fixed effects to Eq. (2).
his procedure controls for any seasonal systemic shocks com-
on to all households within the community. Since remittances
nd credit are likely correlated with shocks, it is important
o control for these as best as possible. To incorporate time-
ommunity fixed effects we modify the proposed IV to represent
he incidence of migration at the comarca level, which is a larger
eographical area than the community.
Table 4 presents the impact estimates obtained. Column I
hows parameter estimates for the first-stage regression, which
dentifies determinants of access to remittances. We find that
he proposed IV positively and significantly influences access
o remittances, consistent with the migration literature. Another
elevant result is that CCTs had a positive effect on household
ccess to remittances only for year 2002, although significant
t the ten percent level. It may be that, over time, households
eceiving CCTs may be able to save a fraction of the transfer to
nance the cost of migrating. However, this result is not robust,
s estimating the effect through DD and the Heckman two-step
election model yields impact estimates that are not significant,
s shown in Table 5.
The second-stage regression, shown in column II of Table 4,
dentifies the determinants of the household’s loan application.
ccess to CCTs did not seem to influence the decision to request
loan, consistent with the DD impact estimates previously
btained. In contrast, the effect of predicted access to remit-
ances on the decision to apply for a loan is significant and the
stimated coefficient has a large positive magnitude. Based on
he theoretical framework presented, this can occur only through
n increase in household expected marginal returns to a loan or
n improvement in loan terms and condition that reduce expected
arginal costs of a loan, or both. The positive impact estimates
uggests these two forces dominate over the decrease in marginal
eturns that the household faces, as its liquidity increases with
emittances.
The data allow us to explore the validity of the IV used to
btain these results. Column III of Table 4 shows that the inci-
ence of migration at the community level does not explain the
ecision to request a loan for the sub-group of households that
ad no access to remittances in any of the years observed. This
roup of households is presumably excluded from the ‘social
earning’ provided by migrant networks present in their com-
unities, and therefore their decision to apply for a loan is
ade independently. This would also rule out general equilib-
ium effects through which migration flows might affect the
ommunity’s economy as a whole. Given the low incidence of
igration and its temporary and domestic nature, this is not sur-
rising. In addition, the Hausman test for endogeneity yields a
ausman statistic of 6.7 with 16 degrees of freedom. Therefore
he null hypothesis that both OLS and IV estimates are consistent
an be rejected at the 95 percent confidence level. This favors
he alternative that the IV estimates are consistent.We also find evidence for the non-economic determinants of
igrant networks in the sample. Further statistical analysis sug-
ests that wealth does not seem to explain the size of migrant
etworks at the community and comarca level during any of
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Table 4
Determinants of access to remittances and the request of a loan at the household level using two-way fixed effects as shown in Eq. (2).
Parameter Access to remittances (I) Credit requesta (II) Credit requestb (III)
μa/δa −0.003 (0.019) 0.023 (0.024) 0.020 (0.027)
μb/δb 0.027* (0.016) 0.023 (0.025) 0.015 (0.029)
Number of men in hh −0.029** (0.016) 0.004 (0.021) −0.017 (0.024)
Number of women in hh −0.009 (0.015) −0.003 (0.021) −0.007 (0.024)
Number of children in hh −0.009 (0.012) −0.008 (0.017) −0.006 (0.022)
Average age of hh members 0.002 (0.005) −0.005 (0.006) −0.006 (0.005)
Homeownershipc 0.014 (0.021) −0.007 (0.027) −0.012 (0.026)
Self-reported value of home (1000s Cordobas) 0.033 (0.028) −0.040 (0.042) −0.060 (0.047)
Shockd 0.009 (0.017) 0.028 (0.026) 0.029 (0.026)
Participation in programs other than RPS 0.024** (0.012) 0.029** (0.015) 0.032** (0.016)
Proxy of migrant networks in communitye 0.075*** (0.008) – 0.008 (0.007)
Participation in community organizations 0.002 (0.013) 0.058*** (0.02) 0.062*** (0.020)
Existence of a microenterprise −0.019 (0.017) 0.017 (0.022) 0.058** (0.025)
Access to remittances – 0.252** (0.108) –
Number of observations 4077 4077 3387
Note: Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
a Second-stage regression for the decision to request a loan using the complete balanced panel, which includes households with and without access to remittances
during each of the years observed.
b Second-stage regression for the decision to request a loan for the subgroup of households in the balanced panel that did not have access to remittances in any of
the years observed.
c Dummy for whether the home plot is owned with or without title.
d Whether the household suffered a shock related to theft, lack of work, low yield, presence of drought or flood and bad coffee prices.
e The proxy is the percentage of households in the home community or comarca participating in migration.
* Significant at the 90% confidence level.
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Table 5
CCT impact estimates on household access to remittances obtained through
the Double Difference (column I) and the Heckman two-step selection model
(column II).
Parameter Access to
remittances (I)
Access to
remittances (II)
t1 0.006 (0.015) 0.049 (0.038)
t2 −0.011 (0.015) −0.095 (0.049)
Pi −0.012 (0.014) −0.013 (0.014)
δa −0.017 (0.020) −0.015 (0.021)
δb 0.022 (0.020) 0.036 (0.024)
Inverse Mills’ ratio – −0.451 (0.309)** Significant at the 95% confidence level.
** Significant at the 99% confidence level.
he years observed. Tables A2–A4 in the Appendix, show that
ouseholds living in communities and comarcas with the largest
igrant networks are no wealthier than those living in equiva-
ent areas with smaller migrant networks. In fact, the lack of
elationship between the size of migrant networks and wealth
eems to be more robust at the comarca level than at the com-
unity level. Therefore, migration behavior does not seem to
e driven by economic factors. Rather, it seems to be explained
y the ‘social learning’ that occurs through migrant networks,
hich we proxy with the proposed IV.
In an effort to control better for unobserved systemic shocks
t the community level, we estimate Eq. (2) by adding time-
ommunity fixed effects. The positive impact of access to
emittances on household loan applications continues to hold,
s shown in Table 6. Evidence for the validity of the IV is still
ound after including time-community effects.
An important consideration for our analysis is that the proxy
or migrant networks is time-variant, enabling the inclusion of
xed effects. Table A5 in the Appendix shows that the average
ncidence of migration at the community and comarca level has
een increasing over the time period observed. Therefore, the
rocess of ‘social learning’ about migration seems to be growing
ver time. Indeed, at the national level, rural to urban and urban to
rban migration flows have been growing steadily in Nicaragua
uring the past decade (Vivas-Viachica, 2007)..4. Gender and access to CCTs and remittances
It is possible that the different impact estimates obtained
or access to CCTs and remittances are the result of different
N
C
Nses given to them by men and women. As mentioned previ-
usly, the RPS provided CCTs mostly to women. Table A6 in
he Appendix shows that migration flows observed are domi-
ated by male migrants who send remittances to their spouses
r partners. This would suggest that, similar to CCTs, remit-
ances are mostly received by women. This is a tendency
hat seems to hold at the national level, as census data for
001 shows men dominate rural to urban and urban to rural
igration flows (Vivas-Viachica, 2007). Given that women in
he sample tend to receive both CCTs and remittances, it is
nlikely that gender-differentiated use of transfers explains the
ifferent impact estimates obtained for access to CCTs andumber of observations 4077 4077
ensored observations – 215
ote: Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
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Table 6
Determinants of access to remittances and the request of a loan at the household level adding time-community fixed effects to Eq. (2).
Parameter Access to remittances (I) Credit requesta (II) Credit requestb (III)
μa/δa −0.034 (0.028) 0.018 (0.044) 0.074 (0.043)
μb/δb 0.054* (0.030) 0.015 (0.042) 0.047 (0.044)
Number of men in hh −0.040** (0.017) 0.022 (0.028) −0.028 (0.026)
Number of women in hh −0.013 (0.015) −0.002 (0.025) −0.029 (0.027)
Number of children in hh −0.005 (0.016) 0.015 (0.020) 0.008 (0.019)
Average age of hh members −0.001 (0.007) 0.002 (0.004) −0.005 (0.004)
Homeownershipc 0.006 (0.024) −0.032 (0.027) −0.037 (0.028)
Self-reported value of home (1000s Cordobas) 0.038 (0.032) −0.055 (0.035) −0.050 (0.049)
Shockd 0.006 (0.017) 0.027 (0.025) 0.027 (0.028)
Participation in programs other than RPS 0.027* (0.012) 0.005 (0.018) 0.021 (0.017)
Proxy of migrant networks in comarcae 0.050*** (0.004) – 0.006 (0.005)
Participation in community organizations 0.004 (0.018) 0.043** (0.019) 0.041* (0.022)
Existence of a microenterprise −0.010 (0.016) 0.044** (0.022) 0.064** (0.022)
Access to remittances – 0.494** (0.242) –
Number of observations 4077 4077 3387
Bootstrapped standard errors are shown in parenthesis.
a Second stage regression for the decision to request a loan using the complete balanced panel, which includes households with and without access to remittances
during each of the years observed.
b Second stage regression for the decision to request a loan for the subgroup of households in the balanced panel that did not receive remittances in any of the years
observed.
c Dummy whether the owned the home plot with or without title.
d Whether the household suffered a shock related to theft, lack of work, low yield, presence of drought or flood and bad coffee prices.
e The proxy is the percentage of households in the home comarca participating in migration.
* Significant at the 90% confidence level.
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. Conclusions
The main purpose of this study is to explore how access
o remittances and CCTs may affect household participation
n credit markets via changes in credit demand and supply.
he induced change in this household decision reveals potential
hanges in its expected marginal returns to a loan or in its cred-
tworthiness as evaluated by lenders and the literature provides
easons to believe that both, CCTs and remittances, may have
his type of effect. Impact estimates obtained suggest that access
o CCTs did not affect the household’s decision to apply for a
oan, while access to remittances increased its likelihood.
Based on the theoretical framework presented, the empirical
esults supports the claim that the protection from income risk
rovided by access to remittances seems to improve the house-
old’s expected marginal returns to a loan by enabling it to cope
etter with negative shocks or by favoring the adoption of riskier
ut more productive technology, as evidenced by the literature.
t may also be that lenders perceive the household’s lower risk
xposure and improve the loan terms and conditions offered in
way that lowers the household’s expected marginal costs of a
oan. This improvement in expectations favoring the request of a
oan seems to more than offset the effect of decreasing marginal
eturns that the household faces once its liquidity rises after the
eceipt of remittances. The latter effect discourages the request
f a loan.
The positive but statistically insignificant impact estimate
btained for access to CCTs suggests that even though access to
hese transfers might be causing an improvement in household
xpectations similar to that caused by access to remittances, this
p
d
iffect seems to be largely offset by the decrease in marginal
eturns to additional income caused by the receipt of the
CT.
The characteristics of these two types of transfers likely
xplain their different impact on the household’s decision to
equest a loan. We argue that, by design, CCTs are not as flexible
esponding to income fluctuations relative to remittances. The
mount of the CCT and the frequency with which it is received
re set exogenously and do not necessarily coincide with the
iming and magnitude of idiosyncratic shocks. Remittances, in
ontrast, tend to coincide better with household shocks given
hat they are the result of a household income risk management
trategy, as evidenced by the NELM literature. This means that
ccess to remittances should have a larger effect than that of
ccess to CCTs on the household’s expected marginal returns to
loan or its creditworthiness as perceived by lenders.
Another possible reason for CCTs having no effect on the
ousehold loan application is perhaps related to how perma-
ent the CCT program is. If households do not know how long
hey will be able to receive the program’s benefits it is unlikely
hat these households make significant changes in investment
nd consumption decisions that require predictions about future
tates of nature. On the contrary, even if migration is only tem-
orary, like the case of households participating in the RPS,
he decision to access remittances is made by these households.
herefore the option of accessing remittances may be more per-
anent than the option of accessing CCTs from the household’serspective. We are able to rule out the possibility of gender-
ifferentiated use of transfers as an explanation for the different
mpact estimates obtained.
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Our findings contribute to understanding how much public
nd private transfers may change household exposure to risk,
nd how these changes may have far reaching effects on house-
old decisions, specifically in their participation in rural credit
able A1
ouseholds participating in the RPS baseline and follow-up surveys (percentage of attrition shown in parenthesis).
Baseline 2000 Follow-up 2001 Follow-up 2002
ompleted interview 1581 (10.4) 1453 (8.1) 1397 (11.6)
Treatment group 810 (8.2) 766 (5.4) 722 (10.9)
Control group 771 (12.6) 687 (10.9) 675 (12.4)
ompleted interviews in 3 rounds 1359 (23.0) 1359 (14.0) 1359 (14.0)
Treatment group 706 (20.0) 706 (12.8) 706 (12.8)
Control group 653 (26.0) 653 (10.5) 653 (10.5)
markets. Those transfers that best protect households from
income risk seem to favor financial deepening. And this is an
externality that has important implications in the process of
economic development.
Appendix A.ource: Maluccio and Flores (2004). Both follow-up surveys were targeted for baselin
n 2002 and vice versa, causing the balanced panel to consist of 1359 households inst
able A2
ean difference test for household wealth indicators present in communities and com
Communities with
migrant networks below
the median n = 695
Communities with
migrant networks abov
the median N = 664
er capita annual consumption (Cordobas)
ean 3792.27 4045.02
-Statistic −1.72*
-Value 0.07
er capita value of durable goods (Cordobas)
ean 363.23 436.76
-Statistic −1.26
-Value 0.20
elf-reported value of the home plot (Cordobas)
ean 12461.03 14793.75
-Statistic −0.58
-Value 0.55
omeownership dummy
ean 0.81 0.82
-Statistic −0.50
-Value 0.61
* Significant at the 90% confidence level.
able A3
ean difference test for household wealth indicators present in communities and com
Communities with
migrant networks below
the median n = 729
Communities with
migrant networks abov
the median N = 630
er capita annual consumption (Cordobas)
ean 3972.32 3717.85
-Statistic 1.60
-Value 0.14
er capita value of durable goods (Cordobas)
ean 329.83 498.38
-Statistic −2.10**
-Value 0.04
elf-reported value of the home plot (Cordobas)
ean 8409.59 9313.09
-Statistic −1.37
-Value 0.17e respondents thus there are some households that participated in 2001 but not
ead of 1397.
arcas with migrant networks above and below the median during 2000.
e
Comarcas with migrant
networks below the
median n = 733
Comarcas with migrant
networks above the
median N = 626
3783.17 3972.12
1.21
0.22
330.65 439.39
−1.57
0.14
12562.62 14932.79
−0.59
0.55
0.84 0.80
1.62
0.12
arcas with migrant networks above and below the median during 2001.
e
Comarcas with migrant
networks below the
median n = 705
Comarcas with migrant
networks above the
median N = 654
4007.68 3885.73
1.61
0.15
380.98 510.30
−1.55
0.11
8438.94 9547.72
1.72*
0.09
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Table A3 (Continued)
Communities with
migrant networks below
the median n = 729
Communities with
migrant networks above
the median N = 630
Comarcas with migrant
networks below the
median n = 705
Comarcas with migrant
networks above the
median N = 654
Homeownership dummy
Mean 0.82 0.84 0.87 0.86
t-Statistic −0.99 1.53
p-Value 0.32 0.15
* Significant at the 90% confidence level.
** Significant at the 95% confidence level.
Table A4
Mean difference test for household wealth indicators present in communities and comarcas with migrant networks above and below the median during 2002.
Communities with
migrant networks below
the median n = 694
Communities with
migrant networks above
the median N = 665
Comarcas with migrant
networks below the
median n = 733
Comarcas with migrant
networks above the
median N = 626
Per capita annual consumption (Cordobas)
Mean 3963.46 3794.76 3782.00 3996.72
t-Statistic 1.09 −1.39
p-Value 0.27 0.16
Per capita value of durable goods (Cordobas)
Mean 453.85 374.39 447.97 376.32
t-Statistic 1.33 1.19
p-Value 0.18 0.23
Self-reported value of the home plot (Cordobas)
Mean 7266.62 8064.15 7125.12 8258.37
t-Statistic −1.12 −1.59
p-Value 0.26 0.11
Homeownership dummy
Mean 0.86 0.88 0.82 0.85
t-Statistic 1.62 1.59
p-Value 0.14 0.12
Table A5
Average incidence of migration within communities and comarcas.
Average incidence of migration: 2000 2001 2002
At the community level (%) 6.79 (1.67) 6.83 (1.45) 6.89 (4.90)
At the comarca level (%) 6.63 (3.71) 6.85 (4.78) 6.87(2.79)
Standard deviation measures are shown in parenthesis.
Table A6
Migrants’ gender and their relationship to the household’s head.
Migrant’s gender Migrants in the sample Migrant’s relationship with the head of the origin household
Spouse/partner Daughter/son Sister/brother Cousin Other
2000
Female 32 (42.10) 1 (3.12) 15 (46.87) 3 (9.37) 2 (6.25) 11 (34.37)
Male 44 (57.90) 23 (52.27) 4 (9.09) 3 (6.82) 2 (4.54) 12 (27.27)
2001
Female 35 (43.75) 2 (5.71) 19 (54.28) 5 (14.28) 1 (2.86) 8 (22.86)
Male 45 (56.25) 25 (55.55) 7 (15.55) 4 (8.89) 0 (0.00) 9 (20.00)
2002
Female 49 (48.51) 2 (4.08) 23 (46.94) 5 (10.20) 2 (4.08) 17 (34.69)
Male 52 (51.49) 28 (53.85) 9 (17.31) 4 (7.69) 1 (1.92) 10 (19.23)
N
Note: Most migrants are males sending remittances to their spouses.
umbers in parenthesis represent percentage of total value.
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